


Sudden Stop: recession, recovery, and countercyclical fiscal policy

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
State real GDP: Hawaii, Nevada (leisure, tourism-based) hit hardest by COVID-19; Hawaii still among slowest to mount recovery




As of January 17, 2022 the highest per capita COVID-19 death rates (deaths per 100,000) were in Mississippi (357), Arizona (346), and Alabama (341), while Hawaii was *lowest* (79). Among states and the District of Columbia (ninth at 178), Washington state, the best performing in terms of quarterly real GDP relative to the end-2019 cyclical peak, was fifth (134). (https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109011/coronavirus-covid19-death-rates-us-by-state/)

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
Original Cares Act (March 2020) was rapid fiscal policy relief response of \$2.2 trillion in support to businesses, individuals, governments




CARES Act stimulus mostly affected savings (like tax rebates 2001, 2008; payroll tax increase 2012): how 2020 relief was allocated



As economic theory predicts: transitory income windfalls are associated with increases in savings rather than consumption




December 2020 \$900 billion supplemental provisions to Consolidated Appropriations Act refilled the tank on some prior CARES measures



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
Biden Administration American Rescue Plan details (\$1.895 trillion), ranked by 2021 outlay, emphasizes individuals, state governments




See also Jared Bernstein and Heather Boushey, Council of Economic Advisers (February 3, 2021) *The Economics of the American Rescue Plan* (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/blog/2021/02/03/the-economics-of-the-american-rescue-plan/) and Congressional Budget Office (February 20, 2021) *Estimated Budget Effects of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021* (https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57012)

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Retail sales—about 10X food services sales—boosted more by federal fiscal stimuli, suggesting post-pandemic structural changes in eating




Both demand and supply factors disrupted auto and light truck sales: deep Covid sales decline, production hiatus, temporary ARPA surge




The actual inflation data: "your mileage may vary" (NYC and Tokyo are the same distance from Honolulu)

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
Quarterly Urban Hawaii *consumer* price inflation 1940-2021: *not* the highest in 40 years; not long percolation like macroeconomic surges




Inflation up from supply chain constraints during 2021, pandemic disruptions, mix of supply (oil, labor) and demand (fiscal) shocks



Big surprise after the initial Covid shock: surge in U.S. real GDP growth from residential investment, homebuilding increase (incl. renovations)




Lumber futures contracts prices fell in mid-2021 as resolution of covid supply chain disruptions began, but unraveled during the second half




^{*} White House releases a statement that it would impose tariffs on \$50 billion of goods from China shortly after announcing the final list of covered imports on June 15, 2018; Peterson Institute for International Economics (https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide).

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End-2021 U.S. Producer Price Index for Construction Materials well above historical inflation rate of 2.4 percent (outside 99% conf. interval)




Component rates of Urban Hawaii inflation to November 2021 say as much about how things were one year earlier as they do recently



Those who forget the past are condemned to retweet it: losing it over oil prices? Remember three years ago, or maybe the last 75 years



Brent crude oil prices (current dollars) May 2, 1987 – January 18, 2022




Constant (2021)-dollar monthly long-run crude oil price cyclical and noncyclical decomposition


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Urban Hawaii core CPI-U inflation measures (less food and energy) illustrate current cap between agg. demand and agg. supply impacts

Annual percent change, year-over-year




Bi-monthly annual percent change, year-over-year




Monetary policy transition to normalization

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
Next steps for monetary policy: tapering asset purchases, tracking supply shocks and inflation, 2022 rate normalization forward guidance



Nominal U.S. Treasury yields: normalization (2004-06; 2016-18): should unfold as indicated in FOMC forward guidance last fall



Implicit inflation expectations: (nominal – real) U.S. Treasury yields: LR inflation expectations $\pi^e \le 2.75\%$ remain well-anchored or at risk?




*Nominal U.S. Treasury yields minus TIPS yields at same maturities

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
Post-pandemic structural change

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Four COVID-19 waves: (1) Alpha (Spring 2020); (2) Aug. 2020 (Oahu lockdown); (3) Delta; (4) Omicron (peaking mid-Jan.)




Resident behavior changes in anonymized Hawaii mobility data: some permanent, less time in workplaces, retail; people act *before* leaders,



^{*}Mahealani Richardson (July 9, 2021) "Ige wants to keep the mask mandate. Green says it's time to drop it," *Hawaii News Now* (https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2021/07/10/state-leaders-debate-over-lifting-indoor-mask-mandate/)

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
Resident behavior changes in anonymized Hawaii mobility data: some permanent, less time in workplaces, retail; people act *before* leaders,



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
Resident behavior changes in anonymized Hawaii mobility data: some permanent, less time in workplaces, retail; people act before leaders,




^{*}Mahealani Richardson (July 9, 2021) "Ige wants to keep the mask mandate. Green says it's time to drop it," *Hawaii News Now* (https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2021/07/10/state-leaders-debate-over-lifting-indoor-mask-mandate/)

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Post-Covid Hawaii labor force participation rates, employment rates now below pre-Covid levels, partly from aging, ratcheted downward




Post-Covid Hawaii participation rates, employment rates, stepped down from pre-Covid benchmarks, diminished by similar factors




U.S. Beveridge Curve: higher unemployment ↔ fewer jobs open; post-pandemic ⇒ even *more* openings for given unemployment


Million U.S. job openings




Alternative measures of Hawaii labor underutilization, 4-quarter trailing through 2021Q3; U-i, i < 3, i > 3 are uninformative about business cycle




Hawaii's Great Resignation—voluntarily separations excl. retirements, transfers to other locations—following summer COVID-19 waves



Hawaii quits not just at historic highs, they followed each covid wave (data not in yet for Omicron); outlier: Spring 2021 upsurge in quits



What do people do after they quit? Census Bureau national business formation statistics suggest some are starting up new enterprises



^{*}Applications for an EIN, except for applications for tax liens, estates, trusts, certain financial filings, applications outside of the 50 states and DC or with no state-county geocodes, applications with certain NAICS codes in sector 11 (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting) or 92 (public administration) that have low transition rates, and applications in certain industries (e.g. private households, civic and social organizations)

'Stop enhanced unemployment insurance and people will return to work" -Every Chamber of Commerce in Murica

"Almost all of the decline in the [labor force] participation rate since the onset of the pandemic is due to changes in job-loss and job-finding rates and thus accounted for by the participation cycle. This is not only true in the aggregate, but also for all of the groups we consider [i.e. by sex, age, education, race and ethnicity]. ... We show that these similarities in the source of the participation declines across groups is indicative of a broader pattern: The very uneven effect of COVID-19 on different groups in 2020 largely has subsided in 2021."


"A longer-run historical comparison ... reveals that both the unemployment rate and participation cycle in June 2021 are comparable with those in the early fall of 2014. Using the labor market expansion after 2014 as a baseline, we show that the participation cycle is likely to lag the recovery in the unemployment rate in coming years, just like it did in previous recoveries."

-Hobijn and Şahin (September 2021) "Maximum Employment and the Participation Cycle"

Note: "The measurement of the participation cycle does not require an estimate of the trend participation rate" (Hobijn and Şahin (2021)) so the illustration in the next slide is for heuristic purposes, only

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Procyclical movement in de-trended *Hawaii* labor force participation rates (%), zeroed at each unemployment rate trough (vertical lines)




*Christopher Grandy (2002), Hawaii Becalmed: Economic Lessons of the 1990s, University of Hawaii Press

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
Remote work is here to stay

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BLS averages for 2017-2018 from American Time Use Survey: small pre-Covid workforce proportions worked from home: days/week




January 2021 NABE member survey of firms: widespread adoption; "Did your company implement new work from home policies?"



U.S. workers who teleworked or worked at home for pay specifically because of COVID-19, excluding those who did pre-pandemic* (BLS)

Percent of U.S. workers who teleworked because of COVID-19




^{*}Or those whose telework was unrelated to the pandemic.

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U.S. workers who teleworked or worked at home for pay specifically because of COVID-19, excluding those who did pre-pandemic* (BLS)


Percent of U.S. workers who teleworked because of COVID-19 by gender



^{*}Or those whose telework was unrelated to the pandemic.

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
U.S. workers who teleworked or worked at home for pay specifically because of COVID-19, excluding those who did pre-pandemic* (BLS)



^{*}Or those whose telework was unrelated to the pandemic.


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
Survey of firms: "Compared to expectations before Covid (in 2019) how has working from home turned out?" (4 survey waves, 2020)



n = 2,500 (May, July, September/October 2020), 5,000 (August)

July 2021 NABE Business Conditions survey (of firms): 66% higher sales, 3% lower sales; 53% < 100 employees, 35% > 1,000 employees





Post-Covid Work From Home?

Q. Are work-from-home policies in your company going to remain in place after COVID? If so to what degree?

n = 92

Worker shortages?


Q. Is your company experiencing shortages of workers? If so, what are the reasons?

$$n = 92$$

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Household pulse data* *for Hawaii* show that ≥ 1/5 of respondents live households in which at least one adult teleworked because of Covid

Hawaii "household pulse" (Census survey) data: percentages of households




^{*} Surveys before April 2021 define "Percentage of adults living in households where at least one adult has substituted some or all of their typical in-person work for telework because of the coronavirus pandemic," from April-June 2021 "Percentage of adults living in households where at least one adult has teleworked because of the coronavirus pandemic in the last 7 days," and beginning in July 2021, "Percentage of adults in households where someone worked onsite at a workplace in the last 7 days (i.e. 64.1% between December 1-13, 2021)."

Comments of BLS Commissioner William Beach on which new data "drove a lot of interest and traffic; what really seemed to take off?"

- "I'm beginning to think that this pandemic...has accelerated structural change in the economy. ...You can sense it in the distributed platform as a way of working—telework. Automation, global value chains had already...wreaked havoc with the workplace but I think the workplace is changing faster today than at any time since the industrial revolution.
- The questions we put out had two sides to them. One side measure the pandemic. ... The other side of that was to take a look at the way that the workplace itself was restructuring. So, we've gone from 36 percent at telework in the payroll employment to about 14 percent and it's leveling off. Well, if it stays at 14 percent that's a very serious, high percentage.
- We did surveys on workplace safety, on sick leave, all of that's changing too as the workplace changes. So, I think the research question coming out of this at least for the Labor Department will be to say:
 - How has the structure of the workplace changed?
 - How has the structure of labor relations changed?
 - because of the pandemic.
- We're not going to go back to normal because the changes already are noticeably permanent in certain areas. That's what our surveys...are beginning to shed light on this, I don't what to call it, maybe it's The New Economy. And on this point 86 percent now of payroll employment is in the services-providing sector...and that really accelerated in the last five years. So, that's another indication that we've got some permanent changes going on."

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Bubblicious Oahu single-family home prices after COVID-19, not so much condos (yet), suggesting source: demand-side preference shift



What do valuation dynamics tell us about pre-/post-Covid markets?


- Common characteristics of asset pricing bubbles: (a) detachment from economic fundamentals;
 (b) information asymmetry; (c) herding; (d) expectations of others' expectations
- Currently, Hawaii housing is not experiencing a meme bubble (GME, AMC, cryptocurrencies)
 - 1. Fundamentals consistent: low interest rates, economic recovery, strong balance sheets
 - 2. Transitory biological event; investors looking to longer-lived assets as safe havens
 - 3. Covid "Donut Effect": 2020 housing demand moving to suburbs, exurbs, Zoomtowns
 - 4. Backwash "Triumph of the City": 2021 relative prices in urban core now attractive
 - 5. Inelastic supply / regulatory barriers: fewer for sale listings, building (verb) constrained
- Novel coronavirus SARS-Cov-2 ⇒ novel factor in housing, commercial RE, labor markets
 - 1. Tourists absent for 6-12 months—zero vacation rental cash flow (drop in condo demand)
 - 2. Remote work / work-from-home (WFH) new source of SF demand—vagabond workers
 - 3. Exacerbating demographic change and net out-migration: medium- to longer-term factors





Appendix: what we build and don't build now


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As economic growth, and growth of private capital formation, levelled off, the private construction *mix* shifted towards renovation









1990


2000

2010


1960


1970


1980




2020












So where's the private construction? Holding its own, but no growth: constant-dollar Hawaii monthly private building permit values, trends

Million constant, 2020 dollars, s.a. (log scale)









Decomposition of statewide real building permit values 1965 - June 2021: same old same old

Copyright 2021
Paul H. Brewbaker, Ph.D., CBE



Sources: County building departments, Bank of Hawaii, Hawaii DBEDT (http://dbedt.hawaii.gov/economic/mei/), U.S. Bureau of the Census (https://www.census.gov/construction/cpi/); seasonal adjustment using Census X-13 ARIMA filter, decomposition using Christiano-Fitzgerald asymmetric band-pass frequency filter assuming stationarity and short:long cycle periods of 90:360 months, trend extraction with nonlinear regression on the non-cyclical component, by TZE.

In broad sweep of history, Hawaii private construction authorizations unlikely to vary much around 0.5 percent growth path of last 46 years



Part of the difference between high growth, low growth economy: public capital formation; annual public construction as % of GDP

